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Although the differential benefits reaped by individual partners are a major determinant of the 
performance impact of strategic alliances, previous analysis has faced methodological challenges. 
In response we propose a measure for relative value appropriation and an explicit theoretical 
framework for predicting its variation in terms of relative bargaining position. With a sample of 
180 biotechnology R&D alliances, we are thus able to explain variation in value appropriation 
across partner types as well as individual partners of each type.  
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How is the value created by an alliance split between its members? When an alliance is 
successful, do the partners share equally in the value created, and if not why not? What 
determines how a “pie” is split between the members of the coalition that creates it? 
The impact of strategic alliances on the performance of individual alliance partners is an 
important yet under-explored area in strategic management research. In general, “empirical 
work investigating the performance of individual alliances is scarce, largely because of 
methodological barriers” (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005: 332). Yet this problem is even more 
pronounced at the level of individual alliance partners. 
Alliance partners are not only interested in overall alliance performance, but also in how much 
they individually gain from the partnership. Thus it is not enough to consider alliance success 
independently of how much each partner benefits from such success, as this latter criterion is 
arguably more important to the individual firm. 
However, analyzing the performance of individual alliance partners poses significant 
methodological challenges. For instance, “since many other activities besides alliances can also 
influence the performance of firms, it can be difficult to empirically link the alliance activity of 
firms with their performance” (Gulati, 1998: 309). 
In response, we propose a new theoretical approach and a new measure of value appropriation, 
which we use to predict and test the determinants of the amount of value created by an alliance 
that each partner appropriates. 
Our theoretical approach derives from work by Adegbesan (2005) who uses the recent 
“bargaining perspective on resource advantage” (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003) to extend strategic 
factor market theory (Barney, 1986; Makadok and Barney, 2001) to account for situations 
where acquiring firms display varying degrees of complementarity to target resources. He 
shows that the amount of value firms stand to capture in such markets depends on the relative 
supply/demand of buyer and seller groups, the relative degree of complementarity between 
individual buyers and target resources, and the bargaining ability of individual buyers relative 
to individual resource suppliers. Thus value appropriation is jointly determined by inter-group, 
intra-group, and intra-pair bargaining over surplus. 
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We apply this theory to alliance performance in the context of biotechnology R&D alliances. 
We conceptualize biotechnology R&D alliances as taking place in strategic factor markets where 
pharmaceutical firms source for specialized knowledge and research skills, while biotechnology 
firms source for funding along with product development, approval process and marketing 
capabilities. As such, there is simultaneous demand and supply for both pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology firms. The resulting competition impacts the “splitting of the pie” in the alliances 
that eventually form. Unlike previous studies, we concurrently consider firm-level, alliance-
level, and group-level determinants of value appropriation. Thus one of the questions we seek 
to answer is “which firms, of which type are able to get the best deals, and why?” 
We proxy the division of created value with the share of a key subset of alliance control rights 
won by each partner. Previous literature has tended to look at control rights as a homogenous 
set responding only to concerns of output maximization and opportunistic behavior. We argue, 
however, that control rights are not homogenous, and fulfill different functions such as the 
splitting of an uncertain future pie, distribution of tasks and responsibilities, planning for 
foreseeable contingencies, efficient alignment of ex post behavior, signalling of congruence, 
etc. Consequently, lumping all of them together leads to ambiguous results. 
In this paper, we focus on the percentage of a subset of ten “pie-splitting” control rights won 
by each partner. “Pie-splitting” (PS) control rights confer ownership and control over activities 
and decisions directly related to the allocation of portions of the overall value to be created by 
an alliance. As such we suggest that bargaining over pie-splitting control rights helps alliance 
partners to work around the uncertainty involved in splitting future value in the present. 
We test our predictions by analyzing a sample of 180 biotechnology R&D alliances entered into 
by 38 pharmaceutical and 108 biotechnology firms between 1993 and 2000. Among other 
results, we find that PS control rights act as substitutes for royalty payments and they appear to 
track performance more closely than a simple count of undifferentiated control rights. We also 
find that pharmaceutical firms as a group appropriate more value when the average external 
R&D spending by pharmaceutical firms is lower, and alternative funding is less available for 
biotechnology firms. On the other hand, R&D firms do better as a group when the availability 
of projects in late-stage research is lower. In addition, individual R&D firms outperform their 
peers when their weighted patent count or their previous alliance experience is greater; while 
they may perform better relative to their pharmaceutical partner when its new product pipeline 
is weaker. Similarly, pharmaceutical firms do better relative to their peers when their experience 
with late stage alliances is greater; while they may perform better relative to their biotech 
partner when its need for external financing is higher. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we start off with a review of 
the relevant literature, followed by an outline of our theoretical approach. We then use our 
theory to generate a series of hypotheses, the tests of which are detailed in the following 
section. Following these, we discuss the implications, extensions, and limitations of our 
findings, before concluding. 
Control Rights, Strategic Factor Markets, and Value Appropriation 
in R&D Alliances 
Previous research into the performance impact of strategic alliances on the firms entering into 
them has been hampered by the difficulties involved in disentangling alliance performance effects  
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from those due to other firm activities. In addition, the confidentiality of the fine-grained data 
required has made it difficult to measure and predict the relative performance of alliance partners. 
For these reasons scholars have employed “a variety of direct and indirect means to test this 
relationship” (Gulati, 1998: 309), and two major approaches can be highlighted (ibid). 
On the one hand, event study analyses of stock market reactions to alliance announcements 
(e.g. Anand and Khanna, 1997; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Koh and Venkatraman, 1991) 
have been used to proxy the likely future impact of alliances on performance. On the other 
hand, researchers have considered the impact of the extent of alliance activity on firm 
performance, generally narrowing the domain of performance explained to measures of 
innovative output such as patents or new products (e.g. Ahuja, 2000; Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad, 1994; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). 
While these approaches have undoubtedly advanced knowledge, they have nonetheless 
provided mixed evidence (Gulati, 1998), and their performance measures suffer from at least 
two problems: Firstly, in many cases (e.g. stock market reactions), the performance measures 
are not causally proximal to activities involved in the alliance process itself. Secondly, 
performance measures are often one-sided and unable to distinguish relative performance 
effects for the distinct alliance partners, as opposed to performance effects for one focal 
alliance partner. 
Alliance Contractual Design 
In a parallel development, research on alliance design is focusing increasingly on the 
contractual provisions firms use to structure their relationships (e.g. Luo, 2002; Mayer and 
Argyres, 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Reuer, Ariño, and Mellewigt, 2005; Ryall and 
Sampson, 2003). Previous work on alliance design had mostly focused on the choice of 
governance form, addressing the question of when equity or non-equity arrangements would 
provide the optimal alliance structure (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Hennart, 1988; Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 
1989). In this respect, it was assumed that equity alliances conferred greater control than non-
equity alliances because of their shared ownership and joint boards (Ariño and Reuer, 2005). 
However recent empirical studies show that contracts of non-equity alliances can and do 
incorporate numerous provisions to help control partner behavior (Mayer and Argyres, 2004; 
Ryall and Sampson, 2003). As such, “parties to an alliance have considerable latitude in 
allocating duties, risks, procedures, and so forth, through individual contractual provisions that 
specify exchanges in more precise terms” (Reuer and Ariño, 2003: 1). In addition, there is 
substantial contractual heterogeneity within particular governance forms such that many key 
clauses are as likely to appear in equity as in non-equity alliances (Ariño and Reuer, 2005; 
Reuer et al., 2005), thus making a sole focus on the equity/non-equity distinction problematic 
(Ryall and Sampson, 2003: 5-6). 
These studies suggest that the analysis of contractual provisions can provide a bridge between 
research on alliance design and research on alliance performance, because contracts also 
specify the distribution of gains between alliance partners (Elfenbein and Lerner, 2003). 
Already, a number of authors (e.g. Ariño, Reuer, Mayer, and Jané, 2005; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002; Reuer and Ariño, 2005; Ryall and Sampson, 2003) have examined determinants of 
contractual complexity [since contractual provisions can be costly and time-consuming to 
negotiate, monitor, and enforce (Argyres and Mayer, 2004; Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Zaheer, 
McEvily, and Perrone, 1998), complexity is related to contracting costs and alliance  
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performance]. However, an important area yet to be explored is how contractual provisions 
reflect the distribution of  returns on collaborative activity. This is important because the 
allocation of rights of control over returns on collaborative activity has a direct impact on the 
performance of each alliance partner. 
Bargaining over Control Rights in Biotechnology R&D Alliances 
“The biotechnology industry has been identified as the industry with the highest alliance 
frequency among several industries characterized by high alliance activity” (Rothaermel and 
Deeds, 2004: 208). This industry has seen thousands of R&D alliances between pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology firms since the discovery of recombinant DNA technology in 1973. 
Biotechnology projects are highly complex and unpredictable, making it very difficult to 
specify the features of the product to be developed ex ante (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; 
Pisano, 1990). In addition, even though the entire process may last more than 15 years and cost 
over $500 million for a single drug, the probability that any given research compound will 
eventually develop into an approved drug is only 0.01% (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). 
Given the associated uncertainties, partner firms cannot directly bargain over the distribution of 
future income streams, but rather over the control of activities and decisions related to those 
possible streams. Consequently, the amount of value individual partners stand to appropriate in 
the future depends on the distribution of a key subset of the alliance’s (“pie-splitting”) control 
rights. For this reason, “the allocation of control rights is a central issue in the negotiation of 
alliances” (Lerner and Merges, 1998: 127). 
“Pie-splitting” control rights. Early theoretical examination of the allocation of control rights 
in alliances built on the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart, 
1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). In this framework, the allocation of control rights is driven by 
concerns of efficient ex ante investment levels, such that control is allocated to the party that is 
most important for the success of the project (Grossman and Hart, 1986). In an important paper, 
Aghion and Tirole’s (1994) model of R&D sourcing extended this idea, adding bargaining power 
to concerns of underinvestment, as drivers of the allocation of control. 
However, empirical studies have provided mixed support for these assertions. For instance, 
although Lerner and Merges’ (1998) study of 200 biotechnology alliances found that the 
allocation of control rights was strongly influenced by the financial strength of the R&D firms, 
they found no impact of efficiency/underinvestment concerns. Similarly, Higgins’ (2005) study 
of 165 alliances found that control rights allocation was influenced mainly by partner 
bargaining power. Nevertheless Elfenbein and Lerner’s (2003) study of Internet portal alliances 
found that while allocation of one subset of rights was responsive to efficiency predictions, the 
allocation of other control rights was responsive to the relative bargaining positions of the 
partners. Additionally, Lerner, Shane, and Tsai (2003) found that when focusing on a subset of 
five control rights, alliance outcomes were consistent with Aghion and Tirole’s (1994) 
predictions, but when they “use the measure of 25 control rights however, the association 
between strength of financial markets and control assigned to the biotechnology firm is no 
longer significant at conventional confidence levels” (Lerner et al., 2003: 432). 
We hold that these results demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between different 
subsets of control rights with distinct functions. Research on alliance contractual design has 
shown that the allocation of control and decision rights responds to varied concerns such as the 
splitting of an uncertain future surplus, the distribution of tasks and responsibilities, planning  
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for foreseeable contingencies, efficient alignment of ex post behavior, signaling of congruence, 
and efficient ex ante investment, among others (e.g. Ariño and Reuer, 2005; Dessein, 2005; 
Oxley, 1997; Ryall and Sampson, 2003). Consequently empirical tests of theory can be 
confounded by the distinct allocation mechanisms underlying different subsets of control 
rights. For this reason, in predicting value appropriation, we extend research on control rights 
by focusing on a subset we call “pie-splitting” (PS) control rights. 
PS control rights confer ownership and control over activities and decisions that directly affect 
the allocation of portions of the overall value to be created by an alliance. As such they help 
alliance partners to work around the uncertainty involved in splitting future value in the 
present. Bargaining over PS control rights is similar to bargaining over options on future 
income because they confer the ability to make decisions affecting the creation and distribution 
of an income stream whose magnitude and even existence are uncertain ex ante. For this reason 
the allocation of PS control rights dictates how much an individual firm will profit from the 
relationship (Higgins, 2005). 
As we will discuss later, we identified PS control rights after an extensive literature review, an 
in-depth analysis of 56 different contractual clauses for each alliance in our sample, a detailed 
analysis of the biotechnology control rights used by Lerner and Merges (1998), Higgins (2005), 
and Lerner et al. (2003), and contributions from practitioners. 
Early- and late-stage markets. We conceptualize biotechnology alliances as taking place in 
double-sided strategic factor markets (Adegbesan, 2005; Barney, 1986; Lippman and Rumelt, 
2003). Biotechnology firms contribute specialized knowledge and research skills, while 
pharmaceutical firms contribute funding along with product development, approval process and 
marketing capabilities. In setting out the terms of their alliance, the partners bargain over the 
sharing of PS control rights related to their collaborative relationship. 
Our conceptualization builds on an important insight from Higgins (2005) who shows that the 
“relative bargaining position of both firms impacts the underlying allocation of control rights” 
(ibid: 3). Previous literature (flowing from the property rights stream) had overlooked the fact 
that in addition to R&D firms jostling for funding, pharmaceutical firms also compete among 
themselves to ally with more valuable biotechnology firms (Higgins, 2005; Higgins and 
Rodriguez, 2005). Therefore, since the dynamics of relative bargaining position vary with the 
stage of development of the lead product candidate when the alliance is signed (Higgins, 2005; 
Lerner and Merges, 1998), we go a step further by decomposing our double-sided market into 
two sub-markets corresponding to early- and late-stage alliances. 
In early-stage alliances, cash-strapped R&D firms find it difficult to raise equity or debt due to 
the informational asymmetries surrounding their specialized work (Lerner and Merges, 1998). 
They thus turn to pharmaceutical firms which are better able
1 than non-specialized investors to 
evaluate their prospects (Lerner et al., 2003). To a large extent therefore, pharmaceutical firms 
can pick the firms they choose to fund, as their research dollars are scarcer than the R&D firms 
seeking early-stage research funding (Powell and Brantley, 1992; Stern and Dukerich, 2006). 
Nevertheless, since pharmaceutical firms enter into R&D alliances in the hope of eventually 
developing new drugs, biotechnology firms with superior capabilities or reputations will retain 
bargaining power relative to other biotechnology firms, as there will be residual competition 
among pharmaceutical firms to ally with more valuable R&D firms (Stern and Dukerich, 2006). 
                                              
1 Or at least, less unable.  
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The roles are significantly reversed in markets for late-stage alliances. Productivity in the 
pharmaceutical industry has declined in the last decade with more drugs losing exclusivity 
protection than the number of new drugs approved by the regulatory authorities (Higgins and 
Rodriguez, 2005). The industry had approximately 1,146 years of aggregate exclusivity 
protection in 1998, but this had fallen to just over 800 years by 2001, with a fairly rapid rate of 
decline (Higgins, 2005). Thus since the farther advanced a research project is the higher its 
likelihood of success, late-stage research projects are very attractive to pharmaceutical firms 
(Higgins, 2005; Rothaermel, 2001). 
At the same time however, biotechnology firms with late-stage research projects have better 
access to external funding, since success in earlier stages alleviates information problems 
(Dessein, 2005; Lerner et al., 2003) and enhances their credibility with investors. Thus 
pharmaceutical firms have to compete for the fewer available biotechnology firms with late-
stage research projects (Higgins, 2005). Nevertheless, since many biotechnology firms lack 
experience of taking new drug projects from clinical trials and regulatory approval through 
manufacturing to marketing (Rothaermel, 2001), pharmaceutical firms with superior research, 
clinical testing and marketing capabilities will retain bargaining power relative to other 
pharmaceutical firms (Helfat, 1997; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). 
Bargaining over value in strategic factor markets. We analyze the determinants of value 
appropriation in these two markets drawing on work by Adegbesan (2005) that extends 
strategic factor market theory (Barney, 1986; Makadok and Barney, 2001) to account for 
situations where buyers display varying degrees of complementarity to target resources 
(Lippman and Rumelt, 2003). The prevalent view in research on strategic factor markets has 
been that firms cannot appropriate gains from the deployment of valuable resources unless they 
have superior expectations about their future value, or they benefit from luck (Ahuja, Coff, and 
Lee, 2005; Barney, 1986; Denrell, Fang, and Winter, 2003; Makadok and Barney, 2001). 
Nevertheless, despite its broad acceptance, this conclusion is true only when there are no 
complementarities between resources (Conner, 1991; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003; Barney, 1988; 
Adegbesan, 2005). 
When there are no complementarities between resources, if the value of a resource R1 on its 
own is v(R1) and the value of another resource R2 is v(R2), then in combination their value is at 
most v(R1∪R2) = v(R1) + v(R2). Thus v(R1) would be the marginal productivity of R1 in the 
combination and Barney’s (1986) logic holds: unless the supplier of R1 doesn’t know what it is 
worth (asymmetric information), the owner of R2 cannot pay less than v(R1) for the services of 
R1. As such, a resource buyer cannot get more than she pays for. 
However, when there is some degree of co-specialization (complementarity) between the 
resources, their combination is “superadditive” and v(R1∪R2) = v(R1) + v(R2) + ∆V where ∆V > 0 
(Adegbesan, 2005; Thomke and Kuemmerle, 2002). The magnitude of the surplus created (∆V) is 
proportional to the degree of complementarity between the resources. It does not “belong” to 
either resource but results from their combination, and the way it is split between them is 
therefore indeterminate ex ante. Thus if the owner of R2 is able to appropriate a positive share of 
the surplus ∆V, she can realize gains to trade even if she had to pay v(R1) for the services of R1. 
Adegbesan (2005) builds on the “bargaining perspective on resource advantage” (Lippman and 
Rumelt, 2003) to show that the portion of surplus captured by each partner depends on the 
joint effects of the relative supply/demand of seller and buyer groups; the relative degree of 
complementarity between individual buyers and target resources; and the bargaining ability of 
individual buyers relative to individual resource suppliers.  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 7 
Figure 1 









1 δ   ∆Vij  0 δ  




2 in Figure 1 in the context of an alliance where two partners, i and j, split a 
surplus  ∆Vij = ui + vj. Adegbesan (2005) formally shows that some of the surplus will be 
guaranteed to the scarcer partner in proportion to the value it could create with the most 
valuable unmatched player ( 0 ∂ ); some will be guaranteed to the bidding partner in proportion 
to its superior complementarity relative to its least valuable matched peer (∆Vij - 1 ∂ ); and a final 
portion is split according to the relative bargaining ability of the alliance partners within a pair 
( 0 1 ∂ − ∂ ). Thus all else being equal, the greater a partner’s relative scarcity, superior 
complementarity, or relative bargaining ability, the greater the value it stands to appropriate 
from the alliance. 
Hypotheses 
We use this bargaining model to link the extant literature to the division of PS control rights in 
biotechnology R&D alliances. When biotechnology firms enter into R&D alliances with 
pharmaceutical firms, their bargaining positions depend on the values taken by the variables 
∆Vij,  1 δ , and  0 δ  shown above. ∆Vij represents the future surplus that any given pair of firms 
{i, j} bargains over,  1 δ  represents the surplus that the least valuable pair bargains over, and  0 δ  
represents the surplus that could be created in an alliance with the most valuable unpaired firm 
(Adegbesan, 2005). 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the division of PS control rights is determined by the relative 
bargaining positions of the alliance partners. In turn, however, their bargaining positions arise 
from the impact of a series of factors deriving from relative scarcity, relative complementarity, 
and bargaining ability. We thus use insights from previous work on R&D alliances to generate 
hypotheses on how these firm-specific, alliance-specific, and environmental factors affect 
variation in the parameters, and thus variation in the share of PS control rights each individual 
firm stands to win. 
 
 
                                              
2 Illustration from Adegbesan (2005).  
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Figure 2 
Determinants of Division of PS Control Rights 
 




Relative Bargaining Ability 
Firm-specific, group-specific, and 
deal-specific factors 
 
Early-stage alliances: relative scarcity. As we discussed earlier, biotechnology firms with 
early-stage projects have limited access to non-specialized funding (Lerner et al., 2003). 
Pharmaceutical firms on the other hand have limited resources to spend on external R&D 
(Pisano, 1990). Thus the number of early-stage projects brought to the alliance market tends to 
outstrip the available financing, such that pharmaceutical firms can pick and choose which of 
the bidding projects to fund (Powell and Brantley, 1992). As R&D firms vary in quality (Dessein, 
2005), those perceived to be more valuable will be preferentially funded, while some of the less 
valuable ones will not receive funding (Powell and Brantley, 1992; Stern and Dukerich, 2006). 
Each pharmaceutical firm is thus guaranteed to appropriate at least  0 ∂  (see Figure 1), the value 
that could be created with the best unfunded R&D firm (Adegbesan, 2005). 
Consequently, the lower the biotechnology funding received from pharmaceutical firms in a 
given period, the fewer the R&D firms that receive funding and thus the more valuable the best 
unfunded R&D firm is (in other words, the greater  0 ∂  is). As we saw earlier, the greater  0 ∂  is, 
the greater the share of PS control rights guaranteed to the scarcer partner (the pharmaceutical 
firm in this case). So we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1. For early-stage alliances, the lower the availability of pharmaceutical funding in 
a period, the higher the percentage of PS control rights won by each pharmaceutical firm.
3 
Early-stage alliances: superior complementarity. In spite of the uncertainty surrounding R&D 
projects, pharmaceutical firms seek to enter into alliances with more promise of leading to 
successful new drugs (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). The variance in quality of R&D firms thus 
ensures there is still some competition between pharmaceutical firms to ally with biotechnology 
firms perceived to be more valuable (Stern and Dukerich, 2006). Consequently, as Adegbesan 
(2005) shows, more valuable biotechnology firms will be guaranteed a level of appropriation 
proportional to their superior complementarity. 
                                              
3 Since we consider the share (percentage) of PS control rights won by a partner, a pharmaceutical firm’s gain (of PS 
control rights) is its biotechnology partner’s loss and vice-versa.  
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A biotechnology firm’s superior complementarity (∆Vij - 1 ∂ ) measures how much more value it 
is likely to create with pharmaceutical dollars, than the least valuable of the R&D firms that 
actually get funded. The greater the value of an R&D firm relative to the least valuable funded 
R&D firm, the more PS control rights it retains (ibid). 
One important way pharmaceutical firms appraise the value of biotechnology firms is by 
evaluating their patent portfolios. An R&D firm’s patent portfolio is considered to be an 
independent observable indicator of its research capabilities and intellectual property pool 
(George, Zahra, Wheatley, and Khan, 2001; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). The greater an R&D 
firm’s patent portfolio relative to other funded firms, the more valuable it is perceived to be, the 
more sought after it is, and consequently, the more PS control rights it will be guaranteed. 
 
Hypothesis 2a. For early-stage alliances, the larger a biotechnology firm’s patent portfolio at 
signing relative to the funded biotechnology firm with the fewest patents, the higher the 
percentage of PS control rights it retains. 
Another factor valued by pharmaceutical firms is a biotechnology company’s previous experience 
with R&D projects (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh, 2002). The failure rate 
of early-stage projects is extremely high. Partly, this is due to the fact that many biotechnology 
firms are startups based on the innovative ideas of one or more university researchers (Stern and 
Dukerich, 2006). Unfortunately, many of these ideas do not stand the test of large-scale 
laboratory development (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). R&D firms that have validated their core 
technologies in previous projects are thus perceived as standing a greater chance of discovering 
valuable new drugs than firms that have not. In addition, previous projects signal the fact that 
other investors have found the R&D firm to be at least a better bet than R&D firms unable to raise 
financing (Dessein, 2005; Leland and Pyle, 1977). Biotechnology firms with greater experience are 
thus more valued by pharmaceutical companies. Consequently: 
 
Hypothesis 2b. For early-stage alliances, the greater a biotechnology firm’s previous experience 
with R&D projects relative to the funded biotechnology firm with the least experience, the higher 
the percentage of PS control rights it retains. 
Late-stage alliances: relative scarcity. Despite the high demand for late-stage projects by 
pharmaceutical firms, only 0.05% of early-stage R&D projects eventually become late-stage 
projects (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Thus to a great extent, the few biotechnology firms that 
bring late-stage projects to the alliance market can choose which pharmaceutical firms to 
collaborate with, causing some pharmaceutical firms less prized by R&D firms to be left without 
late-stage projects in a given period (Sarkar, Echambadi, and Harrison, 2001). This time 
therefore,  0 ∂ measures how valuable the best unmatched pharmaceutical firm is. 
The fewer the late-stage projects in a given period, the fewer the pharmaceutical firms that are 
able to enter into late-stage alliances, and thus the more valuable the best unmatched 
pharmaceutical firm is. As we saw earlier, the greater  0 ∂  is, the greater the share of PS control 
rights guaranteed to the scarcer partner (the R&D firm in this case). So we hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 3a. For late-stage alliances, the lower the availability of late-stage R&D projects in a 
period, the higher the percentage of PS control rights won by each biotechnology firm. 
The ability of pharmaceutical firms to win late-stage alliances depends as well on the 
availability of alternative funding for biotechnology firms. In early stage projects, 
pharmaceutical firms also act as information intermediaries, since asymmetric information 
prevents public investors from evaluating the prospects of biotechnology firms (Dessein, 2005; 
L e r n e r  e t  a l . ,  2 0 0 3 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  a s  R &D projects advance into late-stage research, initial 
information problems are alleviated and biotechnology firms are likely to shift to public 
investors who do not demand as great a premium as pharmaceutical firms, since the latter 
require a return that compensates them for their investment of both financial and specialized 
human capital (Lerner et al., 2003). 
Consequently when equity markets are more favorable, fewer biotechnology firms will bring 
late-stage projects to the alliance market (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner et al., 2003), and 
fewer of the most-prized pharmaceutical firms will be able to enter into late-stage alliances. As 
such, the value of the best unmatched pharmaceutical firm ( 0 ∂ ) rises, and each biotechnology 
firm entering into a late-stage alliance wins a greater share of the PS control rights. 
 
Hypothesis 3b. For late-stage alliances, the greater the availability of alternative funding for 
biotechnology projects in a period, the higher the percentage of PS control rights won by each 
biotechnology firm. 
Late-stage alliances: superior complementarity. Late-stage research projects advance beyond 
purely laboratory work through increasingly large-scale clinical trials, product development, 
repeated regulatory filings, manufacturing process development, and, ideally, full-scale 
manufacturing and commercialization (Blau, Pekny, Varma, and Bunch, 2004). While many 
pharmaceutical firms have experience and skills in these areas, most biotechnology firms do 
not (Rothaermel, 2001). Consequently, the knowledge and capabilities of pharmaceutical firms 
increase the probability of success for new drug candidates (ibid). 
As pharmaceutical firms vary in their capabilities and accumulated know-how (Helfat, 1997; 
Henderson and Cockburn, 1994), competition remains between biotechnology firms to ally with 
more valuable pharmaceutical firms. The more valuable pharmaceutical firms are thus 
guaranteed a level of appropriation proportional to their superior complementarity (Adegbesan, 
2005). A pharmaceutical firm’s superior complementarity (∆Vij - 1 ∂ ) measures how much more 
value it is likely to add to a late-stage research project, than the least valuable of the 
pharmaceutical firms that enter into late-stage alliances. As we saw before, the greater a 
pharmaceutical firm’s value relative to the least valuable matched pharmaceutical firm, the 
more PS control rights it retains. 
Pharmaceutical firms that have been involved in more late-stage projects in the past are more 
valuable late-stage partners (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004). Over 
time such firms build up the complementary assets necessary for carrying out large-scale 
clinical trials, strong relationships with regulatory authorities, and extensive manufacturing, 
detailing, and distribution capabilities and infrastructure (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; 
Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). Thus pharmaceutical firms with greater experience of late-stage 
projects are more prized by biotechnology firms, and are consequently guaranteed more PS 
control rights than other pharmaceutical firms with lesser experience. As such:  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 11 
Hypothesis 4a. For pharmaceutical firms entering into late-stage alliances, the greater a firm’s 
previous experience with late-stage R&D projects relative to the pharmaceutical firm with the 
least experience, the higher the percentage of PS control rights it retains. 
Nevertheless, knowledge of the regulatory approval and commercialization processes are not 
the only contributions pharmaceutical firms can make to late-stage alliances. Late-stage 
projects continue to require intensive ongoing research and development in response to initial 
clinical results, indications from regulatory authorities, and continual technological advances in 
the research area (Blau et al., 2004). Thus pharmaceutical firms able to contribute superior R&D 
expertise are more valuable in late-stage research projects (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). In 
addition, research-intensive pharmaceutical firms have a larger stock of relevant scientific 
knowledge, as well as greater absorptive capacity for assimilating and contributing to the 
biotechnology firm’s knowledge base (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; George et al., 2001; Helfat, 
1997). Consequently pharmaceutical firms that are more research-intensive will be more sought 
after by biotechnology firms. 
 
Hypothesis 4b. For pharmaceutical firms entering late-stage alliances, the greater a firm’s R&D 
intensity relative to the pharmaceutical firm with the lowest R&D intensity, the higher the 
percentage of PS control rights it retains. 
Early- and late-stage alliances: relative bargaining ability.  Whenever the least valuable 
matched bidding player is more valuable than the most valuable unmatched bidding player (i.e. 
1 ∂ >  0 ∂  in Figure 1), there is a portion of the PS control rights over which partners cannot 
credibly threaten to exercise their strategic alternatives (Adegbesan, 2005). This portion is 
common to all pairs, and is split according to the relative intra-pair bargaining positions of 
alliance partners (ibid). Thus the more favorable an alliance member’s bargaining position relative 
to its partner, the stronger its bargaining ability and the greater the share of the portion  0 1 ∂ − ∂  
it wins. As such, this residual bargaining ability reflects which partner needs the other more. 
A biotechnology firm’s bargaining ability is strongly influenced by how desperately it needs 
external financing (Lerner and Merges, 1998). Most biotechnology firms’ financing projects on 
their own have negative cash flows, and their “survival time” is proportional to the size of their 
financial reserves (Lerner et al., 2003). Biotechnology firms that are closer to running out of 
cash are more desperate for external funding, and thus have a weaker ability to bargain over PS 
control rights (Higgins, 2005; Lerner and Merges, 1998). Consequently we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 5a. The lower a biotechnology firm’s need for external funding, the higher the 
percentage of PS control rights it wins. 
On the other hand, a pharmaceutical firm’s bargaining ability is strongly influenced by the 
health of its product pipeline (Higgins, 2005; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2005). Pharmaceutical 
firms with static or deteriorating product pipelines will be more desperate for promising R&D 
projects, and thus less able to extract value from their partner (Higgins, 2005). Thus “in terms 
of bargaining position, [pharmaceutical] firms in this situation can be viewed as having to 
negotiate from a position of weakness” (ibid: 19). Consequently, we posit that the healthier a 
pharmaceutical firm’s pipeline, the greater its bargaining ability relative to its partner, and the 
more PS control rights it wins.  
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Hypothesis 5b. The healthier a pharmaceutical firm’s new product pipeline, the higher the 
percentage of PS control rights it wins. 
Methods 
Our theoretical approach suggests that intra-alliance value appropriation depends on firm-
specific, group-specific, and alliance-specific factors. In order to test our theory therefore, we had 
to obtain rich data on each R&D alliance and each individual biotechnology/pharmaceutical firm, 
as well as information characteristic of the overall groups of biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
firms. 
Data and Sample 
We obtained alliance information from Recombinant Capital, a California-based consulting firm 
that has specialized in tracking the biotechnology industry since 1988. The firm’s database is 
reputed to be one of the two most comprehensive publicly available data sources documenting 
alliance activity in the global biotechnology industry (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005), and is 
typically licensed by major pharmaceutical, accounting, and law firms for a considerable 
annual fee (Lerner et al., 2003). 
Recombinant had identified about 18,300 alliances between 1973 and 2006, from securities 
filings with federal and state authorities, news accounts, and press releases (Recombinant 
Capital, 2006). It provides summaries for about 13,000 alliances, detailed analyses for about 
1,300 alliances, and over 5,000 actual alliance contracts (ibid). Since Recombinant updates its 
database with subsequent filings and new information over time, we chose to focus on alliances 
that were initiated between 1993 and 2000, giving a five-year time frame (i.e. 2001-2006) for 
the identification of material information, while focusing on R&D projects that are not too far 
removed in time from current developments in the industry. 
As of January 2006, Recombinant had identified 2,173 alliances between pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology firms that took place between 1993 and 2000, and which involved a license. Of 
these we randomly selected 180 alliances for which detailed analyses and contract information 
were available,
4 as follows: 
We started by randomly selecting 160 alliances. Based on our theoretical model, we excluded 
alliances where: 
 
                                              
4 “The choice of which alliances to analyze by Recombinant may not be random. Their selection procedure was 
described by an employee as follows: ‘The first criterion is that the deal contracts are available. For that to happen, 
one of the two parties has to publicly trade stock in the US and the alliance has to be material to the company. For 
the deal to be material, it should comprise about 10 percent of a company’s annual revenue or 5 percent of its asset 
value. We find contracts for about 40 percent of the deals. As we find deal contracts, those that are considered 
interesting or important are put into a queue to be analyzed. The really big deals are no-brainers, but I think 
interesting deals or deals that illustrate or typify current trends are also chosen. On top of that, we analyze deals as 
part of our consulting practice. Web and consulting clients ask us to analyze particular deals that then become part 
of our collection. Also, analysts sometimes analyze a bunch of related deals as part of a research project to answer a 
specific question. All told, one in ten deals is analyzed’” (Higgins, 2005: 13).  
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•  One of the parties was a government agency, a non-profit organization, or a university; 
•  Both firms were biotechnology or pharmaceutical firms; 
•  There existed no research component or aspect to the alliance (e.g. a purely 
manufacturing or distribution alliance); 
•  One firm had a controlling interest in the other firm; 
•  There were more than two partners in the alliance; 
•  The pharmaceutical firm was carrying out R&D on behalf of the biotechnology firm. 
Following Lerner et al. (2003), we eliminated alliances that violated one or more of our criteria, 
replacing them with another random draw. We then examined the 160 resulting alliances to 
identify the stage in the regulatory approval process at which the agreement was signed. 
Following previous research, alliances pursuing molecule discovery, lead molecule development 
or pre-clinical development were coded as “Early-stage” alliances, while those in clinical testing 
or undergoing regulatory review were coded as “Late-stage” alliances. 
As expected, the great majority of the alliances (73%) were early-stage projects. Therefore in 
order to obtain a sample size sufficient for testing our late-stage hypotheses, we randomly drew 
20 more late-stage alliances (again following Lerner et al.’s selection procedure) to bring our 
sample to 64 late-stage alliances and 116 early-stage alliances, for a total sample size of 180. 
To avoid biasing our sample in an unpredictable way, we used only the original 160 alliances 
for tests on the overall sample, reserving the 20 additional alliances for tests of late-stage 
hypotheses. 
For each alliance, we extracted information including: the date and length of the alliance, the 
technology and subject covered, total value, up-front payments, royalty rates, contingent or 
milestone payments, and R&D payments. In addition, we carried out an in-depth content analysis 
of each contract to identify the allocation of various control rights, the presence and amount of 
royalties, and equity purchases among other issues. Our contract analysis also enabled us to 
verify (and in a few cases, correct) information reported in the alliance summaries. 
Having constructed the deal-level data, we then proceeded to supplement it with data on each of 
the identified firms and groups, to construct our dependent and independent variables. As further 
discussed below, our sources included the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the National 
Bureau of Economic Research patent databases (biotechnology firm patents), the Compustat 
Global Issue and the Research Insight databases (firm financial data), the Securities Data 
Corporation (biotechnology IPO data), the FDA Orange Book (pharmaceutical patent profiles and 
marketing exclusivity), and the IMS Health database (pharmaceutical patented drug sales). 
Dependent Variable 
To identify which control rights were “pie-splitting,” we combined an extensive review of 
literature on biotechnology R&D alliances and alliance contractual design with input from 
industry practitioners, including the head of alliance management at one of the top-ten global 
pharmaceutical firms. Our detailed analysis of each agreement also gave us an important sense 
of which rights depended more on firm bargaining position than, say, efficient task assignment, 
or protection against potential opportunistic behavior. For example, the right to management of  
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clinical trials is highly coveted by both biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms. However, we 
did not include this right as a pie-splitting right because it is more related to the ability to 
determine the course of the collaboration, than the division of returns to such a partnership. In 
other words, while non-PS control rights can be very valuable to both partners, we focus here 
on PS control rights, as a result of our interest in how value is split as opposed to the 
undeniably related issue of how it is created. 
Our PS control rights are composed of the following 10 “slices,” described in more detail in the 
Appendix: 
•  Intellectual Property Rights 
1.  Partial patent ownership 
2.  Exclusive patent ownership 
3.  Right to transfer of unpatented “know-how” 
4.  Ownership of unpatented “know-how” 
•  Licensing Rights 
5.  Right to sublicense 
6.  Continued licensing rights on expiration 
•  Manufacturing Rights 
7.  Right to manufacture final product 
•  Marketing Rights 
8.  Basic marketing rights 
9.  Universal marketing rights 
10. Control of entire marketing process 
 
We carried out a detailed analysis of 56 contractual terms identified by Recombinant Capital in 
each alliance agreement, to extract the allocation of these PS control rights. Following previous 
literature, we adopted the convention of coding the rights allocation from the point of view of 
the pharmaceutical firm (“1” if assigned to the pharmaceutical firm, “0” if assigned to the 
biotechnology firm or “N/A” – not allocated). 
In order to relate our results to previous work, we also identified: the 25 control rights used by 
Lerner and Merges (1998); the 5 control rights used by Lerner et al. (2003); and the 10 control 
rights used by Higgins (2005). As highlighted in the Appendix, our PS control rights comprise a 
subset of Lerner and Merges’ 25 rights (8 of them), 1 control right unidentified by Lerner and 
Merges which Higgins uses, and 1 final PS right which was identified in conversations with 
practitioners. 
We counted the number of PS control rights allocated in each agreement, and following our 
coding convention, we calculated the percentage of such rights won by the pharmaceutical 
firm. This latter variable (pharmaPS percentage) is the principal dependent variable used in this 
study. However, we also explore a number of secondary dependent variables to check the 
robustness of our results. 
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Firstly we consider the “royalty split” between alliance partners.
5 Royalty splits have the strong 
advantage of being an explicit value-sharing measure, but they also have the disadvantage of not 
telling the whole story of surplus division on their own. For example, a partner may sometimes 
trade a reduced share of the royalty split (or none at all) for, say, co-promotion rights, or exclusive 
patent ownership. In addition, royalty splits may partly serve to compensate for costs incurred by 
one partner on behalf of the alliance. As such, royalties are not always purely a mechanism for 
sharing surplus (which is what our theory predicts). Finally, although many biotechnology R&D 
alliances include royalty terms, the majority of such terms are confidential, making it difficult to 
obtain royalty data. Despite these difficulties, however, looking at PS control right splits combined 
with royalty splits should give a good picture of value appropriation. 
We were able to extract royalty data for 61 of the deals in our sample (34%). By subtracting the 
percentage royalty paid from 100%, we generated the variable pharmaRoyalty percentage, 
which we use in some of our regressions. 
Finally, to compare our principal dependent variable with other measures, we include analyses 
where the dependent variable is a simple count of the PS control rights won by the 
pharmaceutical firm (pharmaPS count); the count of 25 control rights used by Lerner and 
Merges (pharmaL&M count); and the count of 5 rights used by Lerner, Shane, and Tsai 
(pharmaLS&T count). 
Explanatory Variables 
We measured the availability of pharmaceutical funding with the variable pharmaceutical funding, 
which captures the annual amount pharmaceutical firms spent on biotechnology R&D alliances in 
billions of dollars (see Table 1 for definitions of all the variables used in this study). We obtained 
these figures from a Recombinant database which tracks trends in alliance financing. 
The availability of alternative funding for biotechnology projects was captured by the total 
amount raised in biotechnology IPOs in the previous year. The data for this variable (previous 
IPO) was obtained from Thomson Financial’s Securities Data Corporation database in billions of 
dollars. 
We tracked the availability of late-stage projects by means of two related variables. Firstly, we 
recorded the number of late stage projects in each period as the variable lateStage number. 
Secondly, we calculated the percentage of projects over a period that were late-stage projects, 
and stored this value as the variable lateStage percentage. 
                                              
5 Strictly speaking, royalties are paid by only one partner. However, in line with our interest in value appropriation, 
we consider the amount “retained” from royalty payments, as the paying partner’s share of the royalty split. In other 
words, if for example a pharmaceutical firm pays 25% on sales as a royalty, we consider it as having “retained” 75% 
of the royalty split.  
16 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
Table 1 
Variables and Definitions 
Variable  Definition       
PharmaPS percentage  Percentage of “pie splitting” rights allocated to the pharmaceutical firm 
 
EarlyStage  Dummy = 1 if stage is molecule discovery, lead molecule 
  development or pre-clinical development 
 
LateStage  Dummy = 1 if stage is clinical testing or beyond 
 
Previous IPO  Total biotech IPO funds raised in previous year, billions of dollars 
 
Pharmaceutical funding  Annual spending on biotechnology R&D alliances, billions of dollars 
 
LateStage number  Number of late-stage projects       
 
LateStage percentage  Percentage of projects in a period that are late-stage 
 
Superior pharma late-project  Measure of firm experience with late-stage projects relative to least 
experience  experienced firms for each period 
 
Superior pharma R&D intensity  R&D intensity of firms involved in late-stage projects divided by firm 
  with the lowest R&D intensity 
 
Pharma pipeline score  Measure of firm level research pipeline health 
 
Pharma market cap  Pharmaceutical firm market capitalization, millions of dollars 
 
Superior biotech project  Number of previous early-stage projects for each firm minus the 
experience  lowest number of previous early-stage projects for each period 
 
Biotech shareholders equity  Biotechnology firm shareholder equity, millions of dollars 
 
Survival years  Firm’s financial resources at end of previous year divided by negative 
  of net income (firms with positive net income are coded as infinite 
 survival  time) 
 
RoyaltyPresent  Dummy = 1 if royalty provision is present in contract 
 
EquityInvolved  Dummy = 1 if equity allocation or purchase is present in contract 
 
DealSize  Total value of alliance payments, millions of dollars 
 
PharmaPS count  Count of the “pie-splitting” controls allocated to pharmaceutical firm 
 
PharmaL&M count  Count of 25 control rights used by Lerner and Merges (1998) 
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By searching the Recombinant database we identified previous biotechnology R&D alliances for 
each firm in our sample, as at the signing of each current alliance. For each year, we then 
identified the allying firms with the least previous early- and late-stage projects. Using this 
data, we constructed variables for Hypotheses 2b and 4a as follows: 
By subtracting the number of previous projects carried out by the early-stage biotechnology firm 
with the lowest number in each period from the number carried out by each other early-stage 
firm in that period, we created the variable superior biotech project experience. This variable 
measures how much greater a biotechnology firm’s previous experience with R&D projects is, 
relative to the funded biotechnology firm with the least experience. 
In a similar fashion, but focusing on pharmaceutical firms in late-stage projects, we generated 
the variable superior pharma late-project experience which measures how much greater a 
pharmaceutical firm’s previous experience with late-stage projects is, relative to the firm with 
the least experience. 
We obtained financial information for both pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms primarily 
from Research Insight. Using this source we calculated the R&D intensity for each 
pharmaceutical firm involved in a late-stage alliance in each period. By dividing this figure by 
the value for the corresponding firm with the lowest R&D intensity, we obtained the variable 
superior pharma R&D intensity, for testing Hypothesis 4b. 
The biotechnology firm’s need for external funding was captured in two ways. Firstly we used 
the size of its shareholder’s equity (biotech shareholders equity) in millions of dollars. Secondly 
we calculated the number of years a biotechnology firm could continue losing money without 
seeking additional financing or cutting back on its research activities (Lerner et al., 2003). As 
such the variable survival years is obtained by dividing the firm’s financial resources at the end 
of the previous year (cash, short-term assets, long-term liquid assets, cash equivalents, and 
marketable securities) by the negative of its net income in the previous year. The very few 
biotechnology firms with positive net income
6 were coded as having infinite survival time 
(ibid). 
Finally the health of each pharmaceutical firm’s pipeline was obtained using data from the (US) 
Food and Drug Administration’s Orange Book. For each pharmaceutical firm in each year, we 
identified the number of projects it had at each stage of the regulatory approval process. We 
then weighted the number of projects at each stage using probabilities that they would end up 
as successful drugs from Krieger and Ruback (2001). We summed these weighted counts to 
generate a measure of pharmaceutical pipeline health called pharma pipeline score (Higgins and 
Rodriguez, 2005). We also captured the growth (positive or negative) in each firm’s pipeline 
from the previous year (pharma pipeline growth). Both variables gave similar results and so we 
use pharma pipeline score. 
Control Variables 
Our analysis of the alliance agreements enabled us to detect the presence of royalty payments 
(royaltyPresent), and equity allocations/purchases (equityInvolved) for each deal. It also 
suggested that royalties or/and equity sometimes substitute for PS control rights allocation, and 
so we sought to separate any effects they might have from those of our explanatory variables. 
                                              
6 92% of the biotechnology firms in our sample were losing money.  
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We also control for the total value of alliance payments (dealSize) and the pharmaceutical 
firm’s market capitalization (pharma market cap). These enable us to detect whether 
pharmaceutical firms simply pay for PS control rights, and whether their ability to win PS 
control rights is a function of their size. While dealSize is obtained from Recombinant Capital 
(millions of dollars), most market capitalization data was obtained from Research Insight 
(billions of dollars). For non-US pharmaceutical firms, share price data and shares outstanding 
were obtained from Compustat Global Issue database, and other currencies were converted to 
US dollars using Compustat Global Currency database with 12 month average exchange rates. 
Finally, since pharmaceutical funding is applied to both early- and late-stage projects, we 
control for the availability of late-stage projects when we perform early-stage regressions 
where pharmaceutical funding is one of the explanatory variables. Similarly, we control for 
total pharmaceutical funding when we perform late-stage regressions where the availability of 
alternative funding is one of the explanatory variables. 
Estimation Procedure 
Due to the fact that we had fractional dependent variables, we could not employ ordinary linear 
regression without implicitly imposing arbitrary limits on the range of variation in our 
independent variables (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). We therefore followed the standard 
procedure of logistic transformation employing maximum likelihood estimation. This was 
implemented using Stata’s “Generalized Linear Models” function, which is specifically enhanced 
to tackle fractional response variables. For the regressions involving count dependent variables 
(pharmaPS count, pharmaL&M count, and pharmaLS&T count) we employed ordered logit 
models. 
Analysis and Results 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and bi-variate correlations for our variables. As can be seen 
from the table, the average pharmaceutical firm in our sample had a market capitalization of 
$51 billion
7 and a weighted new product pipeline score of 257 (median of 166). It had been 
involved in 12 late-stage alliances prior to the focal alliance, and it had an R&D intensity of 
12%. Furthermore, the typical late-stage pharmaceutical firm had been involved in ten more 
late-stage projects than the marginal late-stage pharmaceutical firm, and it had R&D intensity 
1.9 times that of the marginal pharmaceutical firm. 
Meanwhile, the average biotechnology firm had been involved in 20 previous R&D alliances 
(median of 14), had a shareholder equity value of $76 million, and would run out of money in three 
years at its current rate of cash burn. The mean early-stage biotechnology firm had been involved 
in 17 more R&D alliances than the marginal early-stage biotechnology firm. 
The average alliance in our sample was valued at $65 million. 73% of the alliances were early-
stage alliances, 91% of them included royalty terms, and 53% involved equity purchase or 
allocation. Out of our ten PS control rights, at least nine of them were explicitly allocated 
between alliance partners in 92% of the deals, further underlining their importance. The 
average pharmaceutical firm won 67% of the PS rights, while the average biotechnology firm 
received a royalty payment of 28%. 
                                              
7 All financial values are in constant (year) 2000 dollars.  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 19 
Finally, the time period spanned by our sample was characterized by average annual 
pharmaceutical spending on biotechnology alliances of $1.1 billion, following on average 
biotechnology IPO funding of $4.8 billion in the previous year. The average number of late-
stage alliances launched each year was 40, representing an average of 15% of the 
biotechnology R&D alliances.
8 
Although none of the bi-variate correlations in Table 2 exceeded the recommended ceiling of 
0.7, we noted some relatively high correlations, due to a number of complex relationships, 
some of which go beyond the scope of this paper. (For instance, a healthy product pipeline may 
be related to previous alliances, and indicates future earning potential, which should in turn be 
reflected in a firm’s market valuation. Similarly, the availability of late-stage projects 
simultaneously affects and is affected by the availability of both pharmaceutical funding and 
public equity financing). 
Therefore, in order to find out whether the correlations adversely affected the independent 
variation in each of our measures, we computed variance inflation factors for all our variables 
in all our analyses. We found that in no case were they up to the recommended ceiling of ten 
(Kleinbaum, Kupper, and Muller, 1988), and the mean variance inflation factor was less than 
four. We were thus confident that regression would be able to discriminate between the 
independent and shared variation in our sample variables. 
Overall Sample 
The first regressions reported in Table 3 explore the variation in control rights allocation over 
the entire sample, using three different dependent variables: pharmaPS percentage (our 
principal variable of interest), pharmaPS count, and pharmaLS&T count.  
Perhaps the most striking feature of Model 1 (pharmaPS percentage) is the pronounced effect of 
the presence of royalty payments on the allocation of PS control rights across both early- and 
late-stage alliances. The variable royaltyPresent is very significant (p < .001), accounting for a 
large part of variation in the share of PS control rights won by the pharmaceutical firm. Thus 
we see that pharmaceutical firms win a larger share of PS control rights when they pay 
royalties. This would seem to suggest that they are willing to pay royalties in return for more 
PS control rights, supporting our view of PS control rights as another mechanism for “splitting 
the pie.” This is also supported by the fact that royaltyPresent is barely significant when 
predicting a count of “important” (Lerner et al., 2003) control rights that are not pie-splitting 
(Model 2). 
 
                                              
8 In spite of the dramatic growth in R&D alliances over the period, the number of late-stage alliances held relatively 
steady, with a consequent fall in the percentage of late-stage alliances over the period.  
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The variable earlyStage is also very significant (p < .01) with a positive coefficient, indicating 
that pharmaceutical firms generally win more PS control rights in early-stage alliances than in 
late-stage ones. This is in line with our theory that pharmaceutical firms are in a weaker 
bargaining position in late-stage projects due to the scarcity of such projects, and the increased 
funding options of the biotechnology firms. This effect holds across Models 1-4, supporting our 
approach of considering the market for biotechnology R&D alliance partners as consisting of 
two sub-markets corresponding to early- and late-stage partners. We also find a significant (p < 
.01) negative effect of biotechnology shareholders’ equity, thus replicating findings from 
previous work (Higgins, 2005; Lerner and Merges, 1998). Finally, as should be expected, our 
theoretically-derived explanatory variables are more significant in predicting our principal 
dependent variable (Model 1) than in predicting alternative measures of value appropriation 
(Models 2 and 3). 
Early-Stage Alliances 
The results in Table 4 (Model 5) explore the allocation of PS control rights in early-stage 
markets. Hypothesis 1 predicted that the lower the availability of pharmaceutical funding, the 
larger the share of PS control rights won by each pharmaceutical firm. We find that 
pharmaceutical funding is negative and significant (p < .01), thus supporting Hypothesis 1. 
We also find support for our hypotheses on the effect of superior complementarity. The variable 
superior biotech project experience is negative and significant (p < .05) suggesting that 
biotechnology firms with superior experience win more PS control rights from their 
pharmaceutical partner, thus supporting Hypothesis 2b. However we do not find support for the 
hypotheses on relative bargaining ability (Hypotheses 5a and 5b). This could mean that 
bargaining over PS control rights in early-stage alliances is driven more by scarcity of 
pharmaceutical funding, and relative complementarity of individual biotechnology firms, than 
the desperation and bargaining skill of individual alliance partners. 
With respect to our control variables, although royaltyPresent is now less significant (p < .1) its 
positive sign continues to suggest that PS rights are a substitute value appropriation mechanism 
that can compensate for royalty payments. On the other hand, dealSize and equityInvolved are not 
significant predictors of value appropriation in early-stage alliances. However, our control for the 
availability of late-stage projects is significant (p < .01), providing further indirect support for 
Hypothesis 1. 
Specifically, for a given level of pharmaceutical funding, since pharmaceutical firms will 
preferentially fund late-stage projects, we would expect that if the number of late-stage 
alliances increased, some funding would be shifted from early- to late-stage projects, thus 
increasing the scarcity of funding for early-stage projects, and consequently increasing the 
share of PS rights won by each pharmaceutical firm (Hypothesis 1). For this reason, the positive 
coefficient on lateStage number is consistent with this hypothesis. Similarly, we would expect 
that for a given funding level and number of late-stage alliances, an increase in the percentage 
of projects in later stages can only come about through a decrease in the number of early-stage 
projects, reducing the relative scarcity of pharmaceutical funding, and thus favoring 
biotechnology firms. As such, the negative coefficient on lateStage percentage is consistent with 
this position as well. Thus our control for the availability of late-stage projects provides 
additional indirect support for Hypothesis 1.  
 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
Finally, we also note that when we change our dependent variable to a simple count of 
undifferentiated control rights (Model 7: Lerner and Merges, 1998), a count of important control rights 
(Model 6: Lerner, Shane, and Tsai, 2003), or even a count of PS control rights (Model 8), several of our 
independent variables lose significance or become marginally significant. 
Late-Stage Alliances 
Table 5 (Model 10) reports results for the analysis of bargaining over PS control rights in late-
stage markets. As can be seen from Model 10, our hypotheses on the impact of relative scarcity 
are supported. LateStage percentage is positive and significant (p < .01), thus supporting 
Hypothesis 3a which predicted that increased availability of late-stage projects would favor 
pharmaceutical firms. Similarly, Hypothesis 3b is supported by the fact that previous IPO is 
negative and significant (p < .05), suggesting that increased availability of alternative funding 
favors biotechnology firms. 
Hypothesis 4a is supported by the fact that superior pharma late-project experience is positive 
and significant (p < .05), suggesting the importance of superior complementarity. However, we 
do not find support for Hypothesis 4b, as superior pharma R&D intensity is not significant. 
We also have mixed results for the impact of bargaining ability (Hypotheses 5a and 5b). While 
biotech shareholders equity is not significant, pharma pipeline score is significant (p < .05), but has 
a sign opposite to the prediction of Hypothesis 5b. Another variable (lateStage number) is also 
significant (p < .01) but opposite in sign to our prediction (Hypothesis 3a). 
With respect to our control variables, royaltyPresent again has a strong significance (p < .01) 
suggesting biotechnology firms may be willing to give up royalties in exchange for a greater 
share of PS control rights. We also find a significant increase (p < .001) in the share of PS 
control rights won by biotechnology firms in larger late-stage deals (dealSize is negative). Since 
average dealSize grows as projects advance in the regulatory approval process, like Higgins 
(2005: 29), we interpret this finding in terms pharmaceutical firms’ preference for later-stage 
projects. This is also supported by the fact that dealSize is not significant in early-stage 
alliances (Model 5). 
Additionally, as before, we note that when we change our dependent variable to counts of 
Lerner et al. and Lerner and Merges’ control rights (Models 11 and 12 respectively), most of our 
significant independent variables become insignificant, while the rest become less significant. 
One final point worthy of note is that Models 4, 9, and 14 capture the impact of our explanatory 
variables on each alliance’s royalty split, mainly for illustrative reasons. Overall, they seem to 
support our position that with PS control rights we are predicting the split of a construct related 
to performance. However, these results are far from conclusive, due to the complex relationship 
between PS control rights and royalty payments. While the two constructs are certainly related 
(e.g. as suggested by the variable royaltyPresent throughout our analyses), we would need more 
detailed information on firm preferences and costs to elucidate the relationship between the two. 
Overall, however, our results seem to us to suggest the importance of relative scarcity, superior 
complementarity, and relative bargaining ability in winning PS control rights, and thus in intra-
alliance value appropriation.  
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Discussion 
We started this paper by asking what determines how the value created by an alliance is shared 
between its members, and we have attempted to address the question in two steps. 
Firstly, we suggested that the ex ante distribution of returns to alliance activity could be 
proxied by the distribution of control over activities and decisions that directly affect the 
allocation of portions of the overall value to be created by an alliance. When alliance outcomes 
are uncertain, the allocation of “pie-splitting” control rights assures partners of value 
appropriation in the event that the alliance is successful. In this way, firms can work around 
the otherwise heroic demands of information and time required for bargaining over (possible) 
future returns in multiple alliances involving multiple partners. Specifically, in the context of 
biotechnology R&D alliances, we proposed a subset of ten PS control rights distilled from 
extant literature and validated by means of in-depth contractual analysis and input from 
practitioners. 
In support of our position, our results suggest that a greater share of PS control rights acts as a 
substitute for an improved royalty split, while the sharing of PS control rights was nicely 
predicted by variables intuitively related to firm performance. The split of PS control rights also 
seemed to track performance more accurately than a count of overall control rights, a count of 
important control rights, or even a simple count of PS control rights themselves. Finally, 
although the relationship between royalty splits and PS control right splits is undoubtedly a 
complex one, some of our results suggest that they vary in a similar way over time. Thus, as 
Figure 3 shows for example, the split of PS control rights seems to lag the royalty split over 
time. Nevertheless, time is obviously only one dimension along which these two variables may 
be related. 
In a second step, we proposed that since many types of alliances can be conceptualized as 
taking place in strategic factor markets where potential partners vary in their complementarity 
to one another (Barney, 1986; Sarkar et al., 2001; Thomke and Kuemmerle, 2002), the ex ante 
distribution of returns to individual partners in such alliances could be predicted by an 
extension of strategic factor market theory proposed by Adegbesan (2005). Applying the model 
to biotechnology R&D alliances we measured relative scarcity, relative bargaining ability, and 
superior complementarity in terms of firm-level and group-level variables, which we then used 
to predict inter-group, intra-group, and intra-pair variation in value appropriation. 
Furthermore, in doing so, our theory led us to decompose the alliance market into two sub-
markets corresponding to early- and late-stage alliances. 
In support of our position, our results show strong support for the structural distinction 
between early- and late-stage markets. Thus we lend support to Higgins’ (2005) finding that the 
bargaining position of both pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms is important, while also 
providing an explanation for empirical work that has found bargaining power “supplanting” 
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Figure 3 



















Our findings also suggest a strong impact of relative scarcity and superior complementarity in 
both early- and late-stage markets. With respect to scarcity, in early-stage alliances, 
biotechnology firms gave up PS control rights when pharmaceutical funding was less available, 
while in late-stage alliances pharmaceutical firms gave up PS control rights when late-stage 
projects were less available. Nevertheless, firm-specific superior complementarity allowed some 
partners to improve their value appropriation even in the face of unfavorable scarcity effects. 
As such, in early-stage alliances, biotechnology firms with superior project experience retained 
more PS control rights, and in late-stage alliances pharmaceutical firms with superior late-stage 
experience retained more PS control rights. 
The importance of firm-specific resources and capabilities is very interesting given the growing 
impact of group-level variables over the period spanned by our sample. For example, as shown 
in Figure 4, the number of R&D alliances has greatly increased over time, while the average 
percentage of PS control rights won by biotechnology firms in early-stage alliances has been 
falling. Thus superior complementarity becomes even more critical if biotechnology firms are to 
be assured of significant value appropriation in early-stage alliances. 
Similarly, Figure 5 highlights one consequence of the intriguing finding that even as the overall 
number of alliances has grown dramatically, the number of late-stage projects has remained 
relatively constant, leading to a progressive decrease in the percentage of late-stage projects. 
Thus as the figure shows, as the percentage of late-stage projects has been falling over time, the 
average percentage of PS control rights won by pharmaceutical firms in late-stage alliances has 
been falling as well. Again therefore, superior complementarity becomes critical for any 
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However, we found limited or contradictory effects for the variables measuring relative 
bargaining ability. This could be because the effects of scarcity and superior complementarity 
“overpower” those of relative bargaining ability in this setting (i.e. for biotechnology R&D 
alliances  0 1 ∂ = ∂  in Figure 1), or because our variables do not truly capture relative bargaining 
ability. We suggest that the former might be the case since the marginal biotechnology (or 
pharmaceutical) firm entering an R&D alliance probably varies little in complementarity relative 
to the best unpaired biotechnology (or pharmaceutical) firm. Thus in this setting most of the pie 
may be assigned by scarcity and superior complementarity, with little room for residual intra-
pair bargaining. 
Overall therefore, we feel confident about proposing that the amount of value an individual 
firm appropriates from an alliance (in the face of competition for alliance partners) depends on 
how scarce it and other firms of its type are; how much more valuable it is than other firms of 
its type; and how good it is at deal-making, relative to its alliance partner. 
As such, we believe that our study makes several important contributions. Firstly, we address 
the critical issue of the impact of strategic alliances on firm performance by investigating intra-
alliance differentials in value appropriation. This is important because unless studies of alliance 
outcomes are complemented by studies of the distribution of returns to collaboration, we will 
be unable to tell if or when better overall alliance outcomes improve the fortunes of specific 
partners in a collaborative relationship. 
Secondly, this paper proposes a method for theoretically predicting and empirically measuring 
value appropriation, with a number of advantages. To start with, since important control rights 
are usually specified in filed alliance contracts, our proxy for value appropriation is readily 
accessible to most researchers. In addition, our measure captures a direct outcome of the 
alliance bargaining process, as opposed to a reaction (e.g. stock price appreciation or 
depreciation) to that outcome. We are also able to simultaneously capture the relative 
performance of both partners. Furthermore, our theoretical approach can be applied to a wide 
variety of situations amenable to representation in terms of coalitional bargaining in a strategic 
factor market. 
Thirdly, our study highlights the fact that individual alliances often take place in the context of 
a wider market for alliance partners. Thus in the face of double-sided competition for potential 
partners, value appropriation is not necessarily symmetrical (as sometimes implicitly assumed) 
and strategic alliances will differentially benefit individual firms and groups of firms. Prevailing 
conditions of supply and demand interact with firm-specific resource and capability 
endowments to determine how much each firm benefits from collaboration. 
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that we do not seek to de-emphasize the importance or the 
benefits of collaboration. Rather, we seek to emphasize the importance of “co-opetition” 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). Heightened consciousness of the fact that alliance partners 
have alternatives will lead firms to critically evaluate what and how much relative value they 
bring to the negotiating table; and this should help them improve their choice of strategic 
alliance partners. Firms are best advised (with respect to value appropriation) to enter those 
alliances where they exhibit superior complementarity relative to other firms. Although 
learning alliances may contribute more to future value creation, they are likely to be less 
favorable in terms of present value appropriation. As such, the tradeoff between value creation 
and value appropriation seems to exhibit the exploration vs. exploitation dilemma (March,  
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1991). Awareness of this tradeoff however, will enable firms to make the choices best in 
keeping with their strategies. 
A fourth contribution of this paper is that it links the growing literature on alliance contractual 
design with the literature on alliance performance, opening the way for further future cross-
fertilization. At the same time, however, we stress that it is important to recognize causal 
heterogeneity in the allocation of different alliance control rights and other contractual clauses. 
As such, researchers need to focus on the “correct” subset of contractual terms, depending on 
the causal mechanisms being studied. 
Finally, our study contributes by providing an empirical application of a theory developed 
through formal modeling. In doing so, it highlights the great promise that the “bargaining 
perspective on resource advantage” (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003) holds for analyzing specific 
strategic issues in the resource-based view. One other indication of this is the fact that the 
present paper is one of very few empirical studies of strategic factor market theory. 
Nevertheless, like all papers, ours too suffers from limitations. Firstly, the absence of other 
measures of intra-alliance value appropriation prevented us from carrying out an extensive 
validation of our new measure. Furthermore, the applicability of our measure is limited where 
alliance partners don’t explicitly allocate control rights, in addition to the fact that some 
measures of value appropriation (e.g. learning) are not easily “allocated” between partners. 
Nonetheless, we should point out that control rights have been used extensively in previous 
empirical research, and our only innovation has been to focus on those rights which we believe 
are related to value appropriation, as opposed to other mechanisms such as protection against 
potential opportunistic behavior, for example. 
Theoretically too, our treatment of the alliance market implicitly assumes that all late-stage 
projects and all early-stage pharmaceutical dollars are identical. This was a necessary 
simplification, in order to bring the power of the coalitional approach to bear on our object of 
study. Finally, we are currently carrying out follow-up work with an increased late-stage 
sample size, in order to improve the statistical power of predictions in that sub-market. 
Nevertheless, we believe that this study indicates a direction for further work on intra-alliance 
performance differentials. From an empirical standpoint, future studies could profitably explore 
the explanatory power of PS control rights in other industry contexts. Alternatively, researchers 
could carry out further contractual analyses to identify other measures of performance that may 
be embedded in formal (or even informal) alliance agreements. Other contractual clauses could 
also be used for testing predictions from property rights theory, transaction cost economics, the 
resource-based view, the relational view, etc. 
From a theoretical standpoint, we believe that the concept of superior complementarity is ripe 
for further analysis. Given its critical impact in sourcing from strategic factor markets, further 
work could explore its antecedents, accumulation/acquisition, and its maintenance. Drawing on 
research on dynamic capabilities, researchers studying alliance performance could explore if 
and how firms are able to configure their complementarity to external resources in order to 
maximize their gains from collaboration. Finally, our theoretical approach, along with other 
variants of the “bargaining perspective” could be fruitfully applied to the study of value 
appropriation in such diverse settings as supplier relationships, technology sourcing, markets 
for star employees, and even intra-firm value appropriation dynamics.  
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Conclusion 
The performance impact of individual alliances is an under-researched area in strategic 
management, and within this area, almost no previous work has attempted to theoretically and 
empirically tease apart the differential benefits reaped by individual alliance partners. In this 
paper we have tried to contribute to this area of investigation by proposing a measure of value 
appropriation and a theoretical approach amenable to the analysis and testing of the relative 
amount of value individual partners appropriate from strategic alliances. While our findings are 
very suggestive, they are not conclusive, and we seek to stimulate further theoretical refinement 
and empirical investigation in this critical area of research.  
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a. “Pie-Splitting” Control Rights 
“Pie-Splitting” Control Rights are coded from the point of view of the pharmaceutical firm, 
following legal practice. While some are cumulative (e.g. basic/universal/marketing process 
rights or partial/exclusive patent ownership), others are binary (e.g. right to sublicense). 
•  Partial patent ownership:  
•  Exclusive patent ownership 
•  Right to transfer of unpatented “know-how” 
•  Ownership of unpatented “know-how” 
•  Right to sublicense 
•  Continued licensing rights on expiration 
•  Right to manufacture final product 
•  Basic marketing rights 
•  Universal marketing rights (all territories, diseases, and products) 
•  Control of entire marketing process (no co-promotion) 
 
b. The 25 Control Rights from Lerner and Merges (1998) 
•  Aspects of Alliance Management 
1.  Right to manage clinical trials 
2.  Right to undertake process development 
3.  Right to manufacture final product 
4.  Right to market universally 
5.  Right to market product alone 
 
•  Determination of Alliance Scope 
6.  Right to expand alliance 
7.  Right to extend alliance 
8.  Right to terminate alliance without cause 
9.  Right to terminate particular projects 
10. Right to sub-license 
11. Right to license after expiration/termination 
12. Right to “shelve” projects 
 
•  Control of Intellectual Property 
13. Ownership of patents 
14. At least partial patent ownership 
15. Control of patent litigation 
16. Right to know-how transfer 
17. Ownership of core technology 
18. Right to delay publications 
19. Right to suppress publications  
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•  Governance Structures 
20. Control of top project management body 
21. Seat on R&D firm’s board 
22. Equity in R&D firm 
23. Right to participate in R&D firm’s financings 
24. Right to register R&D firm’s stock 
25. Ability to make public equity purchases 
 
c. The 10 Control Rights from Higgins (2005) 
•  Intellectual Property Rights 
1.  Ownership of patents 
2.  Control and responsibility for patent litigation process 
3.  Transfer of unpatented R&D “know-how” 
 
•  Licensing Rights 
4.  Right to sub-license 
5.  Royalty payment tie-ins 
 
•  Clinical Trial and Distribution Rights 
6.  Management of clinical trials 
7.  Control of initial manufacturing process 
8.  Marketing rights to the product 
 
•  Exit Rights 
9.  Product reversion rights upon termination 
10. Right to terminate without cause 
 
 